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INTRODUCTION  
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) comprises eight Francophone, five Anglophone, and 
two Lusophone countries. The total population was about 387 million people, with a combined Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of $689,197million and an average GDP per capita of $ 1301.6 (World Bank, 2019). These countries were 
categorized into two zones namely the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the West Africa 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Over the years, the ECOWAS has built a commendable institutional architecture even 
though implementation was the heightened challenge (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015). 
Comparatively, the ECOWAS performed better in macroeconomic convergence, free movement of persons, and 
financial integration than other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa (Africa Regional Integration Index, 
2016). The World Bank’s Doing Business (2016) ranked Ghana, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Mali 
as the most favourable business environment among the ECOWAS member-states. However, indigenous producers 
were faced with a small market size in country-specific, limited credit facility, and competition from the international 
markets among others. This has led the ECOWAS to pursue rigorous infrastructural projects and initiate a policy 
framework for greater integration to reduce trade costs. In this background, Cabo Verde, Ghana, and the Gambia ranked 
highest in regional infrastructure, and also Nigeria and Ghana ranked highest in trade integration (Africa Regional 
Integration Index, 2016). 
International trade is demonstrated by evidence as a predominant factor in stimulating economic growth and 
development by raising the level of income. In this background, Infrastructure reduces trade costs and ensures 
efficiency in transactions (Celbis, 2013; Martincus et al, 2014). In line with this, studies have shown weak institutions 
and substandard trade and transport infrastructure adversely affect trade by compounding to the trade costs (Deen-
Swarray et al, 2012; Akpan, 2014; Engel & Jouanjean, 2015;  Hanson & Owusu, 2015; Poelhekke & Bonfatti, 2017; 
Onyekwena & Oloko, 2016; Bah & Jackson, 2017: Yushi & Borojo, 2019). Additionally, the difference in the 
infrastructure of trading partners causes trade imbalance (Lopez & Thia, 2020). Furthermore, Sustainable Development 
Goals 9 and 16 emphasize the need to increase industry, innovation and infrastructure, and guarantee peace, justice and 
strong institutions respectively. As a result, the role of institutions and infrastructure in the facilitation of trade has been 
given much attention in developing countries therefore the exigency for appropriate institutions and infrastructure to 
attenuate trade costs, facilitate trade activities, and consolidate the gains from trade. Empirically, Ndulu et al. (2008) 
showed that the poor growth recorded in Africa during the 1980s was attributed to weak institutions and the growth 
resurgence was due to improvement in the existing institutions in the 1990s.  
The ECOWAS aimed to promote corporation and integration to reduce the level of poverty in the bloc. As a result, the 
role of the ECOWAS evolved overtime by resolving conflicts, initiating policies to attenuate corruption, ensured the 
implementation of Rule of law, assisted in the fight, and disparaging extreme armed groups. The 1991 Political 
Declaration of the ECOWAS aligned policies on Peace and Security, the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, 
Elimination of unconstitutional change of Government and Human Rights. The parlous events not captured under the 
Law of ECOWAS and the recommendations by the African Economic Community and the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights led to the revised treaty in 1993 (ECOWAS Commission, 2015). In this background, Article 6 of 
the Revised Treaty, spelled out the establishment, composition, and functions of institutions of the ECOWAS. In 1999, 
the ECOWAS Summit then agreed on a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution, Peace and Security to be exercised in line with the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance by the Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The Protocol on 
the Fight against Corruption stipulated in Articles 48 and 49 mandated the ECOWAS member-states stamp out 
corruption in 2001. These policies were strengthened with the 2001 Declaration on the Fight against Trafficking in 
Persons, the ECOWAS Gender Policy in line with the establishment of the Gender Development Center in 2003, the 
2010 Regional Action Plan incorporated the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the 2011 Kampala 
Declaration. In 2006, the ECOWAS Summit further devised institutional reforms to empower the community by 
instituting formal structures and institutional arrangements (Bossuyt, 2016). In 2013, the ECOWAS also agreed on the 
Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism as an anti-terrorism strategy to curb the menace. 
 
 
Since its inception, the ECOWAS had laid down regional infrastructural projects to facilitate trade notable in 
multimodal Transport, Energy, and telecommunication. In this background, the ECOWAS infrastructure Projects and 
Preparation and Development Unit (PPDU), the ECOWAS Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation 
Programme, The Transport Facilitation Project, the INTELCOM II programme under the  Telecommunication and Air 
Transport Project under the ECOWAS Air Transport Action Plan 209-2015 and the Yamoussoukro Decision were 
committed to reducing the infrastructure deficit. In 2018, the ECOWAS Commission also set out the legal basis for 
sustainable quality infrastructure within the framework of the West Africa Quality System Programme (WAQSP).  
The Partnership between the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility 
(NEPAD-IPPF) and the ECOWAS infrastructure Project Preparation and Development Unit (PPDU) to improve upon 
rail transport, shipping, air transport, and maritime transport. Also, the Global Infrastructure Forum, the ECOWAS 
Sahel Strategy, the Vision 2020, the Vision 2050, the programme for Tran-West Coastal Highway, and the 
Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics of which some ECOWAS members hold membership, were introduced to bridge 
the infrastructure gap. Additionally, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) outlined several 
projects in West Africa which included the Abidjan-Lagos Highway Development Project, Praia-Dakar-Abidjan 
Corridor Development Programme, Dakar-Niamey Multimodal Corridor, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou/Bamako, West 
Africa Hub Port and Rail Programme, and West Africa Air Transport. In this background, Twenty out of fifty one 
projects were coordinated by the ECOWAS Commission for the West Africa sub-region (ECOWAS, 2016). 
Infrastructural projects among the member-states were heavily financed through several sources. In this background, 
the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) was the indigenous financier for infrastructural projects, 
Special programs, and other development projects embarked on by the community. The ECOWAS further launched 
the development of FODETE, a fund to support infrastructure projects in the energy and transport sectors. Other 
financiers include the European Union, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID). Countries such as Canada, China, Japan, Spain, Germany, Denmark, United 
Kingdom (UK), and Norway facilitated some projects in the community.  
In terms of integration, the ECOWAS moved from a Free Trade Area (FTA) to a Customs Union in 2015 towards a 
proposed Common Currency in 2020,  to stimulate trade flows, serve as a bridge to rectify the problems likely to 
surface in the formation of a common market and curb the reluctance of member-states to open up to trade. However, 
the policy on common currency was derailed by the inability to attain the macroeconomic convergence and the 
contemporaneous lethal effect of the Corona Virus Disease pandemic (Abban, 2020a). Despite the effort, intra-regional 
trade is consistently below 12% of total trade.  
Figure 1. A trend analysis of intra-regional trade in the Economic Community of West African States (2000-2019) 
 
Source: UNCTAD Database 
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The unsatisfactory trade flows among member-states were attributed to relatively poor diversification of the economies, 
similar climatic conditions, strong trade ties with colonizers, relatively large informal sector, non-tariff barriers, trade 
and transport infrastructure, inadequate power infrastructure, the use of sovereign currencies, substandard market 
integration, policy divergence between regional and country-specific due to politicians targets of short term 
infrastructure to woo votes, non-implementation of regional policies to facilitate integration, among others (Akpan, 
2014; Bossuyt, 2016; Toress & Seters, 2016; Abban & Abebrese, 2019; Abban, 2020a). According to the World Bank 
(2015), nearly every country in West Africa fails to respect the equivalence of the national certificate of the exporting 
country, therefore, institutions on trade have come under scrutiny. In this light, the exigency to investigate the impact 
of institutions and infrastructure on intra-regional trade in the ECOWAS.  
Currently, there exists one empirical study that focused on the historical reflection of institutions on trade in the 
ECOWAS hitherto limited studies on West Africa country-specific (Bah et al, 2017; Abasimi et al, 2018). In this 
context, Bah et al (2017) threw light on the historical reflection of trade institutions in West Africa. This study seeks 
to investigate the impact of institutions on trade in the ECOWAS for policy purposes. Additionally, there exist no 
empirical studies on the role of aggregate trade and transport infrastructure in the ECOWAS. In this background, there 
exist limited studies undertaken on multimodal transport, its effect on growth and development, and the related barriers 
in the ECOWAS (Ranganathan & Foster, 2011, Akpan, 2014; Peprah et al, 2016; Toress & Seters, 2016; Ali & 
Krammer, 2016; Iheonu et al, 2017). 
Objectives of the study  
1. To investigate the impact of  institutions on trade among members of the ECOWAS  
2. To investigate the impact of trade and transport infrastructure on trade among ECOWAS member-states. 
Research Questions  
To achieve the above objectives, the study seeks to address the following questions:  
(i) Are the existing institutions contributing significantly to trade?  
(ii) Are the existing trade and transport infrastructure having a significant effect on trade in ECOWAS? 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
According to Coase (1992, p.718), it makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without 
specifying the institutional setting within which trading takes place. Given this, Rodrik (2009) showed that virtually 
every major development strategy of the past five decades has fallen short of becoming a panacea.  Additionally, 
Easterly (2001) showed the failed policy-oriented panacea that has failed which includes conditional aid, debt 
forgiveness, foreign aid, education, family planning, big infrastructure projects, foreign investment, and so on. In his 
argument, none of these activities will have any impact on development unless countries meet the basic institutional 
requirements: rule of law, corruption-free government, and protection of property rights, efficient bureaucracy, and 
political constraint on the Executive. In this background, the current paradigm influencing recent reforms emphasizes 
the importance of improved institutions as one of the key factors enhancing trade hence economic growth. In this 
context, formal institutions have proven to reduce uncertainty which creates transaction costs, especially currency risk, 
thereby reduces the cost of doing business. In this context, institutions have proven to facilitate trade and ensure 
transparency (Peng, 2009; Iwanow, 2012; Beyer & Fening, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2014; Krenz, 2016; Yushi & Bogojo, 
2018; Álvarez et al, 2018).In West Africa, the level of underdevelopment was attributed in part to weak pre-colonial 
and extractive colonial institutions (Rodney, 1981; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Richards & Nwanna, 2010). Therefore the 
need to design a policy framework to tackle the challenges of enhancing trade, economic growth, and alleviating 
poverty.  
 
 
An important notion highlighted by the literature on contract enforcement and its impact on trade is that firms might 
adapt their organizational structures to cope with imperfect enforcement of contracts (Antras & Helpman, 2004). In 
particular, firms often respond to poor contract enforcement by vertically integrating their production processes. 
According to Nunn (2007), countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production (and export) of goods 
for which relationship-specific investments are most important. The author also found that differences in contract 
enforcement abilities of nations affect the global trade pattern to a greater extent than differences in physical and human 
capital. The key assumption is that the impact of contract enforcement regulations on the comparative advantage of 
complex goods is reduced when firms are better able to integrate vertically. Given that production processes vary 
between industries, different sectors will have different inherent capacities for vertical integration. This implies that 
the institutional environment can have an impact on organizational structure, which in turn affects the structure of 
economic exchanges, productivity, and other factors. Ranjan & Lee (2007) undertake an empirical analysis of the 
impact of contract enforcement on trade, demonstrating that trade volumes are more affected by contract enforcement 
quality in sectors that are more institutionally-intensive. The authors find a positive correlation between the quality of 
contract enforcement and the volume of international trade, with this impact becoming more pronounced for more 
differentiated goods. 
Kaufmann & Wei (1999) tested the ‘efficient grease’ hypothesis which stipulates that firms may find bribes helpful to 
minimize the effective red tape it faces.  However, they find that corruption does not improve exchanges, instead, if 
corruption is widespread, time spent with bureaucrats and the regulatory burden is high. Additionally, Winters (2004) 
highlighted that “the less restrictive is trade policy, the lower are the incentives for corruption while simpler more 
transparent and non-discretionary policies reduce the scope for corruption.” Empirically, Ades & Di Tella (1999) 
argued that there is a correlation between economic rents resulting from trade restrictions, active industrial policy 
measures, and higher corruption rates. Corruption, as demonstrated by Mauro (1995), lowers investment and economic 
growth. Moreover, Wei (2000) examines another potential reason for the relationship between corruption and trade 
openness: “open countries face greater losses from corruption than less open ones because corruption impinges 
disproportionately on foreign transactions. As a result, they have greater incentives to develop better institutions.” Wei 
(2000) supports this hypothesis through a cross-country panel analysis. The author shows that corruption is associated 
with what he terms “natural openness” (the share of trade that can be attributed to clear exogenous variables such as 
distance, population, and land area), but not with “residual openness.” The latter term Wei defines as the difference 
between actual and natural openness which can be related to the economic policies implemented by a country. 
Chor (2010) provides theoretical foundations to the notion that institutions might impact trade by affecting countries’ 
comparative advantage. Chor analyses different sub-components of institutional quality and develops a model that 
measures the effects of factor endowments, Ricardian productivity, and institutions. The results confirm the role of 
factor endowments and various types of institutions as a source of comparative advantage. Levchenko (2004), whose 
model of international trade examines differences in institutional quality based on an incomplete contract as the source 
of comparative advantage. In his study, the model indicates that poor countries with weak institutions may fail to benefit 
from trade, as trade pushes factor prices to diverge. Nunn (2007) also examines the effect of contracting institutions on 
trade but his initial assumptions somewhat differ from Levchenko. The author finds that countries with good 
contracting institutions tend to specialize in exports for which relation-specific investments are most important. His 
estimates show that the quality of contract enforcement explains a larger share of global trade patterns than counties’ 
factor endowments. Analysis by Costinot (2009) proposes a theoretical model seeking to explain how contract 
enforcement institutions affect comparative advantage. Under free trade, the country where teams are larger – in 
efficiency units of labour – specializes in the more complex goods. In our set-up, it is the country where the product of 
institutional quality and workers' human capital is larger. Hence, better institutions and higher levels of education are 
complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex industries. The government enforced trade 
barriers, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, also contribute to trade transaction costs (Baeten & den Butter, 2006).  
The argument of Shirley (2005) highlighted that, in environments where obtaining information on the forthcoming 
transaction is expensive and where private property is less than perfectly protected, contracts are more difficult to 
specify and enforce for all possible eventualities. As a result, transaction costs increase, with negative consequences 
for productive activity. Shirley (2005) notes that “societies with persistently higher transaction costs have less trade, 
fewer firms, less specialization, less investment, and lower productivity. Institutions determine whether transaction 
costs are low or high. 
Moreover, Berkowitz et al. (2006) assess how the quality of national institutions, in particular those related to complex 
products whose distinctive features are hard to fully specify in a contract, affect international exchange. The authors 
show that well-designed institutions in an exporting country increase international trade. Institutions in both the 
importing and the exporting countries are assumed to influence transaction costs in simple and complex products. But 
“while international transaction costs affect the costs of trade, domestic transaction costs affect complex and simple 
products differently, thereby changing comparative advantage. McLaren (2000) examines how trade openness 
influences the organization of production in industry equilibrium. The author argues that opening to trade has the effect 
of “thickening” the market, giving each firm a greater selection of procurement options from “downstream” suppliers. 
Also, Antràs & Helpman (2004) proceed from similar assumptions regarding firms’ choices on final good production. 
They show that when trade costs decline, final-good producers tend to rely more on foreign outsourcing than on the 
creation of multinational firms. The ECOWAS is ambivalent about whether institutions are playing a key role in trade 
or an exigency for a newly designed policy framework to expose the large informal, address policy shortfalls and 
maximize the gains from the touted policy on the common currency.  
Empirical studies on trade and transport infrastructure show that trade and transport infrastructure played a significant 
role in trade facilitation. Francois and Manchin (2013) examine the impact of infrastructure and institutional quality on 
bilateral trade flows. The study adopted a multilateral resistance in the estimation of the gravity model of international 
trade. The study lagged the values of time-varying explanatory variables to control for endogeneity of infrastructure 
and institutional quality. The result showed that institutional quality was an indispensable determinant of bilateral trade 
flow among countries. Akpan (2014) evaluated the gains from improving road infrastructure on trade in the ECOWAS. 
The study focused on the 11 coastal countries along the Lagos- Dakar road with exception of Niger, Mali, Cape Verde, 
and Burkina Faso. The methodology used in the study is the gravity model of international trade. The results show that 
improving road infrastructure will increase intra-regional trade by 5.27% as compared to 2012 trade statistics. The 
study also showed that improvement in road infrastructure will facilitate free movement of people hence intra-regional 
trade.  The study concludes by emphasizing the need for soft infrastructure to achieve the laid down goals of the 
ECOWAS. Ismail and Mahyideen (2015) investigated the effects of several indicators of physical and soft infrastructure 
on the trade flows of Asian countries. The study quantified the impacts of both hard and soft infrastructure on trade 
flows for exporters and importers and economic growth indicators. The result showed that improvements in each 
transport infrastructure such as the roads, ports, railways, air transport, and logistics facilitated trade. Bankole et al 
(2015) examine the impact of information and communications technology infrastructure on intra-Africa trade using 
archival data obtained for 28 African countries. The result showed that information and communication infrastructure 
and institutional quality have a positive effect on intra-Africa trade. Their results suggest that institutional quality and 
telecommunication infrastructure inures efficiency in intra-African trade flows. Peprah et al (2016) evaluated the 
prospect for freight and logistics companies in the operationalization of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of 
Goods and Persons using primary data. The methodology used in the study was qualitative in nature. The result showed 
that the introduction of the protocol facilitated trade and organizational growth within the West African countries. Seck 
(2017) analyzed the impact of infrastructure and institutional quality on the trade flow of different countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. The study examined the degree to which various elements of trade cost Africa may have contributed 
to shaping intra-and extra-trade by adopting several trade facilitation measures such as information and communication 
technology, regulatory environment, trade finance, physical infrastructure, border efficiency, and logistics performance 
for 2007 and 2012. The result shows African firms adjust to changes in the environment. Munim & Schramm (2018) 
investigated the impact of port infrastructure and logistics performance on economic growth using 91 counties. The 
study constructed latent variables estimated as a Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) for the analysis. The study 
showed that development in port infrastructure and logistics inures greater gains to the economy of a country hitherto 
the logistics performance. Yushi & Begoro (2019) investigated institutional quality and infrastructure on intra-regional 
trade in Africa using forty-four countries with a data span from 2000 to 2014. The study used the two-step Heckman in 
the estimation of the gravity model of international trade. The study showed that the level of trade is influenced by the 
quality of institutions and infrastructure. To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical study on institutions on 
trade in the ECOWAS hitherto limited studies conducted a comprehensive analysis on the aggregate impact of trade 
and transport infrastructure, with much focus on multimodal transports. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
The study used a dataset with 3780 bilateral trade observations spanning from 2000 to 2017 (some observations are 
missing for the dependent variable). Data for bilateral trade were sourced from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTs) and UN Comtrade, real GDP was sourced from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), distance 
from CEPII and Institutional quality data were sourced from World Governance Indicators, data on Logistics 
Perception Index from World Bank, data on Tariff was obtained from World Bank’s ESCAP.  
To investigate the impact of institutions on trade in the ECOWAS, the augmented gravity model of international trade 
was used. Several empirical studies have adopted the augmented model to estimate the effect of institutions on trade. 
This study followed the works of Kunčič (2013), de Groot et al. (2005), Francois & Manchin (2013), Ogundipe et al. 
(2014), Álvarez et al (2018), Yushi & Begoro (2019) and many others. 
 The augmented model is stated as follows; The Impact of institutions on trade  
Xijt=β0+β1ln(YiYj)t+β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)+β3lnDij+β4Contij+β5Langij+β6Comcolij+ɤRL+γCrpctrl+δGE+φGF
+σVA+πPS+ɛ …………………………………………………..3.1 
Where RL+Crpctrl+GE+GF+VA+PS are institutional quality indicators 
Xijt=β0+β1ln(YiYj)t+β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)+β3lnDij+β4Contij+β5Langij+β6Comcolij+πPS+qytTinf+δTariff+ɛ 
……………………………….…………………………….……..3.2 
Where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: Xij denotes the value of bilateral trade 
(exports) between i and j ,Y is real GDP, Pop is population, Dij is the distance between i and j , Inst is the institutional 
quality variable represented with six indicators, Contij is a binary variable which is unity if  i and j share a land border, 
Langij is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j have a common official language, ComColij is a binary variable which 
is unity if i and j were colonized by the same colonial master, RLij denotes the product of rule of law in the country-
pairs, VAij denotes the product of voice and accountability between country-pairs, PSij represent the product of political 
stability and absence of voice between country-pairs, GEij represents the product of Government effectiveness between 
country-pairs, RFij represent the product of regulatory framework of country pairs, ε is a vector of nuisance coefficients, 
and represents the myriad other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved. Where I = 1, 2 … N  is 
the number of countries where N =15, t is the time-series dimension of the data (T =18 years). The coefficient of 
interest is β6.  
 
 
3.1 Definition of Variables and Expected Signs  
  
The export of goods was used as a proxy for bilateral trade between the reporting country and the partner in line with 
each country’s attempts to balance its trade with the other. The data on exports were reported at the levels to suit the 
non-linear estimation technique procedure. The variable was adopted in the model to represent trade flows between 
countries since the level of imports is usually underestimated. GDP was used to proxy for the economic mass of the 
country in the model. The study expected GDP to have a positive relationship with trade. It was measured as the log 
product of the GDP of country-pairs. Distance is the transportation cost involved in trading between the two countries. 
The coefficient of distance is expected to have a negative relationship with trade. The higher the transportation cost, 
the higher the price of the goods to be traded and vice versa.  
This is because, as distance increases the cost of trading among countries ostensibly increases thereby reducing the 
volume of trade. Border is defined as the geographic boundaries of political entities such as countries, provinces, states 
amongst others.   
The coefficient of sharing a land border is expected to have a positive relationship with trade. Spatial theory of trade 
depicts that countries sharing border tends to cooperate to enhance trade. The dummy was represented with 1 if the 
country-pairs share the same border and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of Language is expected to have a positive 
relationship with trade. Adam Smith argued in ‘Wealth of Nations’ that common language enhances trade and exchange 
through effectively communicating the task in hand to the trading partners and easily convincing parties to know it is 
in their best interest. The dummy was represented 1 if the country-pair shared a common official language and 0 
otherwise.  Institutions are defined as ‘sets of formal and informal rules governing the actions of individuals and 
organizations, as well as the interaction of participants in the development process according to the World Bank. The 
coefficient of institutions is expected to have a positive relationship with trade. This paper employs six different key 
indicators of institutional quality as provided by the World Governance Indicators, WGI (2019) database namely; rule 
of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and government effectiveness. Rule of Law captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Moreover, 
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  Also, the control of corruption was captured as 
the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as the capture of the state by elites and private interests. Furthermore, Government Effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are related to the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and initiate sound policies, which is quite similar to business regulations, measured 
by the Doing Business indicators. Voice and Accountability as defined by WGI, Voice and Accountability captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and free media. Finally, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
The coefficient is expected to have a positive impact on trade. The various indicators of institutions were measured as 
the log product of the country-pairs. According to the World Bank ESCAP, Tariff answers the question, ‘Evaluate the 
effect of tariffs on agricultural goods.’ The coefficient of tariff is expected to be negative hence harm trade. It was 
measured as the log of the value for the country-pairs.  Also, the World Bank Logistics Perception’s Quality of Trade 
and Transport infrastructure focuses on roads, railroads, ports, and information technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Estimation Technique  
Although authors recommend estimating the gravity model using a log linearized approach, it is now standard to 
estimate the AvW model with a fixed effect Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) since it controls for 
heteroscedasticity, zero trade, and model misspecification (Gourieroux et al, 1984: Silva Santos and Tenreyro, 2011). 
Thus, the PPML includes observations with zero trade values of which linear estimation techniques will drop because 
the logarithm of zero is undefined which leads to sampling selection bias. As a result, the omission of relevant 
observations poses serious problems, and information is loosed (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1996). Furthermore, the robust 
standard errors do away with problems associated with panel data estimation. Also, PPML fits the data better by 
controlling for heteroscedasticity than a log-linear model since the error term has a variance occurring at a higher 
moment which can be influenced by one or more explanatory variables (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Thus, the 
second and highest moment conditions are absent from the estimation procedure.  
Therefore, the coefficients of log linearized models can be highly misleading due to the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Moreover, the PPML, unlike the log-linear estimator estimates the effect of policy variables on trade whereas the log-
linear estimator estimates the policy variable on the log of trade which can be misleading. Additionally, the PPML is 
consistent with a small sample size as well as a large sample size. To buttress, the Monte Carlo simulation test on the 
best estimator for the gravity model of international trade stipulates the gravity model is best estimated as a non-linear 
model (Silva-Santo and Tenreyro, 2006; 2011). Further studies on the best estimator for the coefficients of the gravity 
model is the PPML (Bobková, 2012; Vavrek, 2018). Given this, the PPML estimation technique becomes the best 
option to estimate the parameters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1: Results for the impact of institutions on trade  
The study estimates the effect of the impact of institutions on trade in the ECOWAS.   
Table 4.3 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimates  
Variables   Coefficients   
GDP   . 1.663 ***   
 (.2764823)   
Distance   -.001***        
 (.0004167)   
Border   -.284   
(.3069309)   
Language   .686    
 (1.073511)   
Colonizer   .477   
 (1.028392)   
Rule of Law   1.397***                
(.5138701)   
Corruption Control   -.293   
(.2038834)   
Government Effectiveness   -.920   
(.9229386)   
Regulatory Framework   -2.165 ***   
(.6788759)   
Voice and Accountability   .496   
(.3640187)   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence   .432*   
(.253727)   
_cons   -15.681 ***          
(5.665889)   
Note: *, ** and *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1%. Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis.  Author’s 
Estimates   
 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law is found to have a positive and significant relationship with trade as the estimated coefficient is 1.397 at 
1%. The existing institutional framework for the protection of rights and properties has attenuated the level of violence 
and crime to a substantial degree in the ECOWAS (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2020). However, the minor 
challenges were terrorism, conflicts, and disputes (AfDB, 2018). Given this, the existing framework can accommodate 
the level of trade of the ECOWAS. Therefore, improvement of the rule of law by providing improved logistics would 
significantly enhance trade flows with one another and reduce trade disputes when further integration is pursued.   
 
Corruption Control is found to have a negative and insignificant effect on trade in sub-region. The estimated coefficient 
of the corruption control variable is -.293. The result shows that corruption controls are not playing their expected role 
to ensure relatively greater transparency but rather compounds trade costs in the sub-region. The result is not startling 
because corruption is widespread in social, cultural and administrative architecture in West Africa (Transparency 
International report, 2017; 2018; 2019). This chunk of corruption in the ECOWAS promotes state fragility and violent 
conflict, therefore, it makes the sub-region unattractive to trade (Jones, 2008; Yeh, 2011; Transparency International 
report, 2017; 2018; 2019). According to Ikenson (2008), countries with lower corruption perceptions are likely to 
perform better on logistics perceptions whereas countries with intense corruption appear to have greater frictions in 
their logistics environments. However, the ECOWAS reduced the rate of corruption in recent unfolding events 
comparative to the 1990s and early 2000s due to the practice of democracy (Escresa & Picci, 2015b). 
Government Effectiveness is found to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated coefficient is 
-.920. This is not startling because the mechanisms to serve as a check for the formulation and implementation of 
favourable policies have not been fruitful in the ECOWAS. This is evident in the conflicting policy direction of regional 
and national policies in the ECOWAS (Atuobi, 2007; Toress & Seters, 2016). In this background, ECOWAS member-
states were found in the lower half or even lower third of the ranking of 146 countries with the least government 
efficiency (Busse et al, 2007; AfDB, 2018).  
Regulatory Framework is found to have a negative and significant effect on trade with an estimated coefficient is -
2.165 at 1%. The result shows that the existing regulatory framework provided an additional incentive to increase trade 
costs in the ECOWAS. The result is not startling because the weak regulatory framework is evidential in the increased 
adjustment costs of trade liberalization and reduced welfare gains from trade due to greater average trade costs (Isukul 
& Chizea, 2016; Ajide & Raheem, 2016).  The prevalence of more regulations makes indigenous producers less 
competitive to foreign competitors. Moreover, excessive regulatory framework leads to lower quality institutions 
signaling countries with weak regulatory frameworks gain less from integration (Djankov et al., 2002; Busse et al, 
2007). This partly accounts for the low level of trade among member states in the sub-region.  
Voice and Accountability are found to have a positive and insignificant relationship with trade as the estimated 
coefficient is .496. The result is startling because indigenes lack information, competence to hold those in power 
accountable, and people in power are not held accountable through institutional processes and mechanisms in 
ECOWAS (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; AfDB, 2018). In this background, the estimate shows there has been an 
improvement from time to time.  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence is found to have a positive relationship with trade as the estimated 
coefficient is .432 and statistically significant at 10%. The result is not startling because ECOWAS efforts toward 
political stability and absence of violence have improved security even though not fully-fledged. In this context, the 
efforts of the ECOWAS towards political, social, cultural, and economic events have enhanced co-operation and 
unification among the member-states (Bamfo, 2013; Van Wyk, 2020). More so, political stability has been strengthened 
over the last decade through the practice of democratic rule notable in elections held in Togo, Cape Verde, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Guinea, and Gambia (Iizuka et al. 2018) 
  
 
 
 
 4.2: Results for the impact of trade and transport Infrastructure on trade 
The study estimates the effect of trade and transport infrastructure on trade in the sub-region.  
Table 4.3 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimates 
Variables Coefficients 
GDP .132  
 (.2698181) 
GDP per capita 2.832***     
 (.6553791) 
Distance -.000       
(0004302) 
Border .333 
 (.3105188) 
Language .635        
 (.4991359) 
Colonizer -.234 
(.471893) 
Volatility -.486* 
 (.2791526) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence .605*** 
(.2057449) 
Infrastructure (qytTinf) -.304     
(1.273924) 
Tariff .289 
(.3433896) 
  
_cons -1.111195  
(3.052715) 
Note: *, ** and *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1%.                                                                                                                                 
 
The coefficient of the quality of trade and transport infrastructure (qytTinf) is -.304 but statistically insignificant. The 
results show that the deplorable state of trade and transport infrastructure has undergone some changes. This is not 
startling because according to Torres & Seters (2016), intra-regional trade was hampered by the high costs of 
transporting goods by road or rail within the ECOWAS member-states noticeably the producers in rural areas. 
Transport prices per ton kilometer from farm gate to primary collection markets tend to be three to five times higher 
than those from secondary (often rural wholesale) markets to wholesale markets located in the countries capitals (FAO, 
2015). Also, railway facilities generally were in a deplorable state and unable to fully function (Japan International 
Corporation Agency, 2012). 
Author’s Estimates 
 
Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis. 
 
Moreover, road density in the ECOWAS member-states remains low compared to other developing regions and rural 
communities continue to have by far the lowest accessibility to all-season roads in the developing world. This differs 
among countries, with more developed countries such as Ghana and Nigeria doing well compared to others (FAO, 
2015). 
Tariff is estimated to have a coefficient of .289 but statistically insignificant. The result is not startling because the 
countries heavily depend on tariffs as a source of revenue even though the charge has been reduced among member-
states due to trade liberation policies (ODI, 2013; World Bank 2015; de Roquefeuil, 2014; Toress & Seters, 2016).   
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The study investigated the impact of institutions on trade in the ECOWAS using six institutional quality datasets. The 
study further investigated the impact of trade and transport infrastructure on trade. Using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) to estimate the augmented gravity model of trade. The study showed that two out of six indicators 
of institutional quality had a positive and significant effect on trade. Given this, the existing institutions do not have a 
significant impact on trade. Given this, the substandard institutions have culminated in the low level of trade and the 
inadequate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow among the members of the ECOWAS. Additionally, the study 
showed that the existing trade and transport infrastructure has adversely contributed to the low level of trade even 
though there has been an improvement over time.  
Rule of law had a positive and significant effect on trade among members of the ECOWAS. In this background, the 
implemented laws of the land are held in high esteem by the indigenes. As a result of population growth, there is the 
need to intensify the vigilance and transparency of state institutions such as the court and law enforcement agencies 
through the provision of logistics to facilitate the implementation of laws and surveillance through car patrolling by 
security agencies in communities. Political stability and Absence of violence had a positive and significant relationship 
with trade among members of the ECOWAS. In this context, the result shows that there are minimal reported cases of 
unconstitutional change of government and politically incentivized violence and terrorism. This incinerates that there 
has been a smooth changeover of governments over the period hence countries have practiced staunch democratic 
governance. As a recommendation, there are existing loopholes in relation to governance by presidents. As a result, the 
ECOWAS should initiate a policy of two-term of governance of the presidents to reduce political scuffle and hullabaloo 
that breeds conflicts. Regulatory Quality had a significant adverse effect on trade among member states. In this 
background, the nonexistence of an appropriate channel for both indigenous and foreign investors has risen the cost of 
doing business therefore an institution for investors has to be established. Additionally, the prevalence of usurious taxes 
dwindles the gains from investment therefore the need to initiate policies of a common transparent tax system coupled 
with tax reliefs for relatively performing private companies. Corruption control had a negative but insignificant effect 
on trade among the ECOWAS member states. Given this, efforts channeled to attenuate corruption has compounded 
the cost of corruption. This could be attributed to the measures implemented at vantage points where corruption-related 
cases are minimal. Given this, the level of corruption depends on the incumbent government. As a result, laws should 
be formulated on how the funds are to be disbursed to the governments. Additionally, delicate institutions such as the 
Central Bank and the Auditor General Office should be devoid of political swing. Given this, an independent ECOWAS 
Central Bank that oversees the activities of all Central Banks is essential for the monitoring and disbursement of funds. 
Finally, a new policy variable on contract execution should be developed to reduce contacts between the governments 
and investors. Government Effectiveness had a negative but insignificant effect on trade. In this context, the 
government’s effort to curtail the ills has not effectively materialized due to the indifference by the leaders even though 
affects the level of trade. Policies are to be channeled to ensure greater transparency in the economy by exposing the 
informal sector through initiating policies that improve trade statistics, reduces smuggling, and research into the motives 
and gains of smugglers corollary to corruption and bribery with stringent supervision. Also, public services should be 
channeled to key sectors of the economy and avoid relatively large social transfers. Additionally, a policy variable 
should be developed for Emergency responses such as disease outbreaks among members. Voice and Accountability 
had a positive but insignificant effect on trade. In this background, some countries have the rights of the populace 
compromised such as freedom of expression and press freedom. As a result, the study recommends that the ECOWAS 
should initiate a policy to enhance press freedom and freedom of speech at all times whiles regulating activities that 
adversely affect the political serene. More so, stringent punishment is to be meted on people who abuse and victimize 
journalists in line with the introduction of standardized apparel for journalists on the field. 
 Trade and transport infrastructure had a negative but insignificant effect on trade. The result shows that trade and 
transport infrastructure also compounds to the low level of trade by raising the trade cost among members. Given this, 
there is a need to complete the construction of regional roads, railway, ports, and improve upon the service delivery to 
open the trade corridors and facilitate relatively greater trade flows across member states. The ECOWAS should 
prioritize reducing the time taken to clear goods at ports, facilitate the completion of the regional railway line, complete 
all outlined road infrastructure projects under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or Build Own Transfer (BOT) 
Agreement to make available in the shortest possible time. Also, there should be a regional market for the pricing of 
goods. To attenuate the smuggling, there should be specified vehicles with a recognizable identity to transport goods 
across borders. Additionally, there is a need for a technological device for the detection of extractive minerals at the 
various points of exit of member countries. Also, the establishment of regional storage facilities and research centres. 
Finally, the ECOWAS should devise a new institutional framework to facilitate transparency, security, and growth by 
curtailing the ills of the community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
     
  
  
    
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of data  
  
 
                                                                              
       _cons     -15.6807   5.665889    -2.77   0.006    -26.78564   -4.575765
          PS     .4316699    .253727     1.70   0.089    -.0656258    .9289656
          VA     .4961672   .3640187     1.36   0.173    -.2172964    1.209631
          RF    -2.165115   .6788759    -3.19   0.001    -3.495687   -.8345424
          GE    -.9195335   .9229386    -1.00   0.319     -2.72846    .8893929
          CC    -.2930149   .2038834    -1.44   0.151    -.6926189    .1065892
          RL     1.397212   .5138701     2.72   0.007      .390045    2.404379
   colonizer     .4774998   1.028392     0.46   0.642    -1.538112    2.493112
        lang     .6857831   1.073511     0.64   0.523     -1.41826    2.789826
      border     -.284417   .3069309    -0.93   0.354    -.8859906    .3171565
  lndistance    -.0013124   .0004167    -3.15   0.002    -.0021291   -.0004956
       lnGDP      1.66264   .2764823     6.01   0.000     1.120744    2.204535
                                                                              
       trade        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                             (Std. Err. adjusted for 144 clusters in pairings)
R-squared: .49402915
Pseudo log-likelihood: -5.099e+10
Number of observations dropped: 0
Number of observations: 1430
Number of parameters: 12
   
                                                                                
         _cons    -1.111195   3.052715    -0.36   0.716    -7.094408    4.872017
        Tariff     .2889088   .3433896     0.84   0.400    -.3841224      .96194
infrastructure    -.3042893   1.375182    -0.22   0.825    -2.999596    2.391018
            PS     .6047855   .2057449     2.94   0.003     .2015329    1.008038
     volatlity    -.4860844   .2791526    -1.74   0.082    -1.033213    .0610447
     colonizer    -.2342866    .471893    -0.50   0.620     -1.15918    .6906066
          lang       .63547   .4991359     1.27   0.203    -.3428184    1.613758
        border     .3332679   .3105188     1.07   0.283    -.2753378    .9418735
    lndistance    -.0004481   .0004302    -1.04   0.298    -.0012914    .0003951
   lnpercapita      2.83205   .6553791     4.32   0.000     1.547531     4.11657
         lnGDP     .1322428   .2698181     0.49   0.624     -.396591    .6610766
                                                                                
         trade        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 96 clusters in pairings)
R-squared: .42626044
Pseudo log-likelihood: -3.512e+10
Number of observations dropped: 0
Number of observations: 502
Number of parameters: 11
 
 
infrastruc~e        1,992     .577607    .2156454          0   .8382685
          PS        2,134   -.7371403    .8604508  -4.356556   .6837254
          VA        2,018    -.656782    .5459141  -2.923602    .244751
          RF        3,330   -.5411694    .4882643  -2.972461   .3999772
                                                                       
          GE        3,258   -.2699306    .4407506  -3.219399   .3937729
          CC        2,955   -.4861001    .7056482  -6.320305    .292497
      Tariff        1,503    2.416208    .3861922   .0345629    3.12503
          RL        2,706   -.3885552    .5384461  -4.884381    .444818
    peakness        3,780    .0018519     .042999          0          1
                                                                       
   volatlity        3,774    .1931224    .2098588   .0001341   1.915696
          cu        3,780    .2661376    .4419955          0          1
   colonizer        3,780    .3224868      .46749          0          1
        lang        3,780    .3761905    .4844928          0          1
      border        3,780    .2410053    .4277501          0          1
                                                                       
  lndistance        3,780    1314.568    777.4092   105.1806   5294.028
 lnpercapita        3,780    5.745322       .3757   4.946437   6.936348
       lnGDP        3,780    19.56702    .9223271    17.6356   22.38172
       trade        3,780    3.74e+07    1.67e+08          0   4.59e+09
       years        3,780      2008.5    5.188814       2000       2017
                                                                       
    pairings        3,780    106.0333    61.06078          1        211
   dum_ctry2        3,780    1213.581    970.8086       1111      11113
   dum_ctry1        3,780    1118.267    4.611708       1111       1125
       ctry2            0
       ctry1            0
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
